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In 2008, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) implemented 
the Pre-Launch Activities Importation Request (PLAIR) program.1  
The FDA exercises its enforcement discretion under the guise of the 
PLAIR program to permit the importation of unapproved finished 
drug products into the United States based on anticipated approval of 
a New Drug Application (NDA) or an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA).2  In other words, the FDA gives drug 
manufacturers permission to import unapproved drugs into the 
United States so the manufacturers can expedite their commercial 
launches when they finally receive official FDA approval.3 
 The FDA developed the PLAIR program with an eye toward 
the globalization of the pharmaceutical industry.4  In particular, the 
intense competition and relatively small margins in the generic 
 
1.  Annual Guidance Agenda, 73 Fed. Reg. 153 (Jul. 30, 2008). 
2. Food and Drug Administration, Draft Guidance for Industry on Pre-launch 
Activities Importation Requests (PLAIR), at 1 (2013) [hereinafter FDA, PLAIR Draft 
Guidance], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance 
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM362177.pdf (“Historically, when applicants 
sought to import unapproved finished dosage form drug products in preparation for 
market launch, FDA considered such requests, informally referred to as Pre-Launch 
Activities Importation Requests (PLAIRs), on a case-by-case basis.  FDA has decided to 
create a more formal program . . . .”).  
3. FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1; Kurt R. Karst, PLAIRs–
What are They and What are FDA’s Current Policies?, FDA LAW BLOG (Apr. 11, 2010), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2010/04/plairs-what-are-they-and-
what-are-fdas-current-policies.html. 
4.  Karst, supra note 3.  
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industry mean that generic companies often must manufacture their 
drugs in foreign countries where production costs are lower.5  While 
generic companies may be able to produce cheaper goods by 
manufacturing in foreign countries, they face additional burdens 
when they import their drugs into the United States, a process which 
is heavily regulated by the FDA.6  One such burden is seeking PLAIR 
approval from the FDA to import a drug prior to FDA marketing 
approval.7  But the ability to import unapproved finished drug 
products into the United States ahead of anticipated FDA approval 
conflicts with certain provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act that 
permit brand-name companies to use permanent injunctions to 
prevent the importation of generic equivalents of their drugs before 
patent expiration.8 
 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc. is the first case under Hatch-
Waxman in which a generic company, notwithstanding a permanent 
injunction, has requested to take advantage of the PLAIR program to 
import a generic drug into the United States before the expiration of 
the pioneer’s patent.9  Although arguments were made on both sides 
regarding whether Apotex should be allowed to take advantage of the 
PLAIR program despite the permanent injunction, Sanofi v. Apotex 
was dismissed for not being timely, and neither the District Court nor 
the Federal Circuit addressed the conflict between PLAIR and 
Hatch-Waxman.10  However, it is likely that more generic 
manufacturers will attempt to take advantage of the PLAIR program 
 
5. Compare World Health Organization, Pharmaceutical Industry, http://www.who. 
int/trade/glossary/story073/en/ (noting that some of the largest pharmaceutical companies 
have profit margins of about 30%) with THE HENRY FUND, GENERIC DRUG 
MANUFACTURERS (2013), http://tippie.uiowa.edu/henry/reports13/generics.pdf (showing 
that the profit margins for the five largest generic manufacturers range from 0.89% to 
18.93%).  See also Christelle Laot, FedEx and Generic Drugs: Connecting Global 
Manufacturers to Consumer Markets, FEDEX BLOG (Mar. 14, 2011), http://blog.fedex. 
designcdt.com/generic-drugs-markets. 
6. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012). 
7. FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1. 
8. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (2012). 
9. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., (nonprecedential order) 1, 2 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
10. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 5-6, Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 
1:02-cv-02255-SHS (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2012); see also Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 3-6, 
8-9 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:02-cv-02255-SHS (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2012); 
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., (nonprecedential order) 1, 3 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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to overcome injunctions and import their drugs prior to FDA 
marketing approval.11 
 This Article analyzes the conflict between the PLAIR program 
and the Hatch-Waxman Act and discusses solutions to the conflict.  
Part 1 of this Article provides an overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
and the regulation of generic drugs.  Part 2 provides an overview of 
the PLAIR program.  Part 3 analyzes the validity of the PLAIR 
program.  Part 4 analyzes the conflict between the PLAIR program 
and the Hatch-Waxman Act and provides a description of the Sanofi 
v. Apotex case.  Part 5 discusses balancing the goals of the PLAIR 
program with the intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Part 6 discusses 
modifying the current regulatory regime to resolve the conflict 
between the PLAIR program and the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Finally, 
Part 7 provides strategic considerations for practitioners in this area. 
1.  Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act  
and the Regulation of Generic Drugs 
1.1.  The Regulation of Drugs Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
In order to market a new drug, or to import it for marketing, a 
pharmaceutical company must first obtain FDA approval.12  Section 
355(a) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) provides that 
“[n]o person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate 
commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application . . . is 
effective with respect to such drug.”13  Because section 355(a) only 
prohibits importation of finished drug products (i.e., products that are 
ready for sale), the FDA has long allowed the importation of 
unfinished drug products into the United States, and has issued 
specific regulations to permit the importation of unfinished bulk 
products ahead of FDA approval.14  Unfinished bulk products can 
undergo further manufacturing, processing, and repackaging in the 
United States prior to regulatory approval, so the finished drug 
product will be ready for an immediate market launch when the FDA 
 
11.  Kurt R. Karst, FDA’s PLAIR Program Collides with Hatch-Waxman, FDA LAW 
BLOG (May 23, 2011), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/ 
05/fdas-plair-program-collides-with-hatch-waxman.html.  
12.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). 
13.  21 U.S.C. § 355(a). 
14.  21 C.F.R. § 314.410(a)(2) (2008) (“A drug substance intended for use in the 
manufacture, processing, or repacking of a new drug may be imported into the United 
States if it complies with the labeling exemption in § 201.122 pertaining to shipments of 
drug substances in domestic commerce.”). 
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finally grants approval.15  While FDA regulations allow the 
importation of unfinished bulk products, no such regulations exist for 
finished drug products.  Consequently, finished drug products cannot 
be imported into the United States ahead of FDA approval, and 
therefore, will not be ready for market launch upon regulatory 
approval.  This effectively places generic companies that manufacture 
in foreign countries at a competitive disadvantage to those who 
manufacture generics domestically.16 
 Despite the absence of such regulations, the FDA has 
historically exercised enforcement discretion to permit the 
importation of finished drug products into the United States ahead of 
anticipated FDA approval.17  As the authority for this enforcement 
discretion, the FDA has cited section 336 of the FDCA,18 which 
provides that the FDA is not required “to report for prosecution, or 
for the institution of . . . injunction proceedings, minor violations . . . 
whenever [it] believes that the public interest will be adequately 
served . . . .”19  By allowing preapproval importation, the FDA seeks 
to promote competition and lower prices of drugs as quickly as 
possible.20 
1.2.  The Regulation of Generic Drugs Under the Hatch-Waxman Act 
Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, to amend section 355(j) of the FDCA and section 271(e) of the 
Patent Act to create the statutory scheme to regulate the modern 
generic pharmaceutical industry.21  The intent of Hatch-Waxman was 
to “strike a balance between ‘two conflicting policy objectives: to 
induce name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments 
necessary to research and develop new drug products, while 
 
15.  21 C.F.R. § 201.122(c) (2012) (“A new drug application . . . has been submitted 
but not yet approved, disapproved, granted, or denied, the bulk drug is not exported, and 
the finished drug product is not further distributed after it is manufactured until after the 
new drug application . . . is approved . . . .”). 
16.  Although it is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that domestic 
manufacturers may also be at a disadvantage, since they likely cannot even begin to 
manufacture their generic products until the pioneer’s patent expires. 
17.  Karst, supra note 3. 
18.  Id. 
19.  21 U.S.C. § 336 (emphasis added); see also Karst, supra note 3. 
20.  E-mail from Peter Barton Hutt, Senior Counsel, Covington & Burling LLP, to 
Author (Feb. 18, 2014, 08:40 PST) (on file with author). 
21.  Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j) (2012), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271(e) (2012)). 
Summer 2014]         CONFLICT BETWEEN PLAIR AND HATCH-WAXMAN           95 
simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies 
of those drugs to market.’”22 
 In order to enable competitors to bring generic copies of 
pioneer drugs to market, Hatch-Waxman provides for an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).23  An ANDA 
applicant is only required to provide proof that its generic copy of the 
pioneer drug: (1) has the same active ingredient and the basic 
pharmacokinetics as the pioneer drug, (2) is bioequivalent to the 
pioneer drug and (3) the dosage form and strength of the pioneer and 
generic are the same.24  However, unlike drug pioneers, an ANDA 
applicant is not required to provide independent proof of either the 
safety or the efficacy of the generic copy, and instead can rely on the 
clinical trial data of the pioneer drug.25 
 An ANDA applicant must make one of the following 
certifications with respect to each patent which claims the pioneer 
drug that it seeks to copy: (I) the drug is not patented or the patent 
information has not been filed; (II) the patent has expired; (III) the 
date when the patent expires and that the generic drug will not go on 
the market until that date passes; or (IV) that the patent is invalid or 
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic 
drug.26 
 Patent challenges pursuant to Paragraph IV are a frequently 
deployed mechanism for the early introduction of generic 
competition.27  When an applicant files an ANDA with Paragraph IV 
certification, two features of Hatch-Waxman apply: (1) thirty-month 
stay, and (2) 180-day marketing exclusivity.  In addition, if the 
pioneer successfully sues the Paragraph IV challenger for patent 
infringement, then the Act allows the pioneer to get a permanent 
injunction against the generic challenger.  
 
22.  aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002). 
23.  H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16. 
24.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv). 
25.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
26.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV). 
27.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT 
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY (July 2002) (reporting challenges involving 130 drugs 
between 1984 and 2000); Examining the Senate and House Versions of the “Greater Access 
to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act” Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 117 
(2003) (statement of Timothy Muris, Chairman, FTC) (noting challenges involving more 
than eighty drugs between January 2001 and June 2003). 
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1.2.1.  Thirty-Month Stay 
The Hatch-Waxman Act also provides that making a Paragraph 
IV certification is itself an act of patent infringement.28  An applicant 
who files an ANDA with Paragraph IV certification must provide 
notice of the ANDA to the patent holder.29  After receiving such 
notice, the NDA holder has forty-five days to bring an infringement 
action against the ANDA applicant.30  If suit is not filed within that 
time, then the FDA can approve the ANDA immediately.31  But if 
suit is brought during that time, then FDA is barred from approving 
the ANDA for thirty months.32 
 During the thirty-month stay, the FDA can only “tentatively 
approve” the ANDA, such that the ANDA can become effective 
immediately upon the expiration of the thirty-month stay.33  The 
exceptions to the thirty-month stay are if either: (1) the patent 
expires, or (2) the district court finds that the patent is invalid or is 
not infringed during the thirty-month stay. In either case, the ANDA 
can be approved immediately.34  
1.2.2.  180-Day Marketing Exclusivity 
 The statute provides that the first applicant to file a Paragraph 
IV ANDA with the FDA will be granted 180 days of market 
exclusivity upon entering the market with their generic equivalent.35  
The FDA is barred from approving later-filed ANDAs for the same 
drug until 180 days after the first filer begins marketing its generic 
copy of the pioneer drug.36  The purpose of 180-day marketing 
exclusivity is to encourage Paragraph IV challenges by rewarding the 
first filer: “[i]n exchange for undertaking the costs and risks of patent 
litigation, the successful challenger is given [six] months of marketing 
without any other generic competition.”37  This marketing exclusivity 
 
28.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (“It shall be an act of infringement to submit . . . an 
[ANDA] for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent . . . .”). 
29.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B). 
30.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(dd). 
34.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)–(IV). 
35.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
36.  Id. 
37.  Representative Henry Waxman, Speech at the Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association’s First Annual Policy Conference: Securing the Future of Affordable Medicine 
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period is valuable to generic companies because they can sell their 
generic drugs at a price significantly higher than if multiple generic 
drugs were on the market.38 
1.2.3.  Permanent Injunction 
 Section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act, which was added as part of 
the Hatch-Waxman amendments, allows courts to order the FDA to 
delay ANDA approval until a patent expires and to grant an 
injunction to prevent the manufacture, use, sale, or importation of a 
drug.39  A patent holder is entitled to a permanent injunction pursuant 
to section 271(e)(4) if: (1) the patent holder brings an infringement 
action, and (2) the district court finds that the patent is both valid and 
infringed.40  But Hatch-Waxman does not include any provisions that 
allow for a permanent injunction to be ignored for pre-launch 
importation purposes.  And because the injunction provisions are part 
of the Patent Act, the FDA does not have discretion to interpret or 
enforce these injunctions.41 
2.  Overview of PLAIR Program 
2.1.  Pre-Launch Importation of Drugs Before the PLAIR Program 
 The FDA has long allowed drug manufacturers to import 
unfinished bulk products into the United States ahead of FDA 
approval.42  Despite Section 355(a) of the FDCA, the FDA has issued 
regulations to permit the importation of unfinished bulk products into 
 
(Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/waxman/news_files/news_statements_ 
generic_pharmaceutical%20_association_9.20.05.htm.  
38.  Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical 
Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 178 n.56 
(2008) (“For example, when generic Prozac (Fluoxetine) entered the market, the first 
generic challenger sold it at $1.91/capsule, or 12% below the cost of brand-name Prozac. 
Two months after the exclusivity period expired, multiple generics had entered the market 
and the price of generic Prozac had dropped to $0.32/capsule.”). 
39.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (“For an act of infringement [caused by filing a Paragraph 
IV ANDA] (A) the court shall order the effective date of any approval of the drug . . . to 
be a date which is not earlier than the date of the expiration of the patent which has been 
infringed, (B) injunctive relief may be granted against an infringer to prevent the 
commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale within the United States or importation 
into the United States of an approved drug, veterinary biological product, or biological 
product. . . .”). 
40.  21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii)(II). 
41.  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000); see also 
discussion infra Part 3.3. 
42.  21 U.S.C. § 355(a); 21 C.F.R. § 314.410(a)(2) (2008); 21 C.F.R. § 201.122(c) 
(2012). 
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the United States ahead of regulatory approval.43  The only restriction 
on such importation is that the label of a drug in a bulk package must 
bear the statements “Caution: For manufacturing, processing, or 
repacking” and “Rx only.”44  These unfinished bulk products can then 
undergo further processing in the United States. 
 However, despite the absence of such regulations for the 
importation of finished drug products into the United States ahead of 
FDA approval, the Agency has historically exercised enforcement 
discretion to also permit such importation.45  But this historical 
enforcement discretion was exercised informally and there is no 
record of how it was used by the FDA.46 
2.2.  The PLAIR Program 
 In 2008, the FDA launched the PLAIR program by issuing 
guidance documents describing its policy for exercising enforcement 
discretion with respect to the importation of unapproved drugs into 
the United States.47  PLAIR formalizes the FDA’s historical exercise 
of enforcement discretion to permit the importation of finished drug 
products into the United States ahead of anticipated FDA approval.48 
 Based on a PLAIR request, the FDA will decide on a case-by-
case basis whether to permit importation of unapproved finished drug 
products.49  An applicant should make a PLAIR request no more than 
two months prior to its expected launch date, but at least one month 
prior to the expected importation to allow the Agency time to process 
the request.50  A PLAIR applicant is required to submit, among other 
things, information on: (1) the drug product name, and (2) the 
warehouse in United States where it will be stored pending FDA 
 
43.  21 C.F.R. § 314.410(a)(2) (2008); 21 C.F.R. § 201.122(c) (2012). 
44.  21 C.F.R. § 201.122 (2012). 
45.  Karst, supra note 2. 
46.  FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1 (“Historically, when 
applicants sought to import unapproved finished dosage form drug products in 
preparation for market launch, FDA considered such requests, informally referred to as 
Pre-Launch Activities Importation Requests (PLAIRs), on a case-by-case basis.”) 
47.  Annual Guidance Agenda, 73 Fed. Reg. 153 (July 30, 2008); see also 
REGULATIONS.GOV (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (The FDA published its annual guidance 
agenda, which included a notice that it was planning to publish a guidance document for 
the PLAIR program.  No comments were submitted by the public in response to this 
agenda.), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2004-N-0056-0003. 
48.  FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1; see also Karst, supra note 3. 
49.  FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1. 
50.  Id. at 4-5. 
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approval.51  In addition, a PLAIR applicant must also submit a letter 
signed by an authorized representative certifying that it will not sell 
the finished drug product before receiving regulatory approval.52  
Notably, the PLAIR applicant does not need to submit any 
information identifying injunctions that may prohibit the applicant 
from importing the finished drug product.  The Agency has 
previously stated that it will respond to a PLAIR request within two 
weeks,53 however the current draft guidance does not specify how 
long the Agency will take to respond.  If the FDA approves the 
request, then the applicant may immediately begin importing the 
finished drug product, notwithstanding any injunctions.54 
3.  Validity of the PLAIR Program 
Because there is no explicit statutory basis for the PLAIR 
program, it is unclear whether the FDA has the legal authority to 
allow the importation of unapproved finished drug products.  The 
constitutional validity of the PLAIR program and the FDA’s ability 
to exercise enforcement discretion under the FDCA are discussed in 
more detail below.  In short, the FDA has the authority to regulate 
the importation of drugs into the United States and the right to 
exercise enforcement discretion to not prosecute a violation of 
section 355(a) of the FDCA.  However, that authority is limited to the 
extent that the importation of finished drug products is not subject to 
restrictions by other regulatory schemes, including the Patent Act, 
outside the control of the FDA. 
3.1.  Constitutional Validity Under Chevron v. NRDC 
 The scope and extent of a federal agency’s authority is limited 
by Congress.55  Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act 
provides that a court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an 
 
51.  FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 2-4. 
52.  Id. at 3-4.   
53.  FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, PRE-LAUNCH ACTIVITIES IMPORTATION 
REQUEST (PLAIR) FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) 1, 2 (July 2013) 
[hereinafter FDA, PLAIR FAQ], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ 
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ImportsandExportsCompliance/UCM297 
907.pdf. 
54.  FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
55.  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”56  When 
an agency acts in a way that is allegedly arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the reviewing 
court must evaluate the agency’s actions using the two-step analysis 
described in Chevron v. NRDC.  First, the court must review the 
agency’s authorizing statute de novo to determine “[i]f the intent of 
Congress is clear.”57  If Congress clearly intended to allow the agency 
to act in the way challenged, then the challenge must be rejected and 
the action allowed.58  However, if Congress did not clearly intend to 
allow the agency to so act, then the court should only defer to the 
agency when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law (e.g., if the 
agency has the power to engage in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking).59 
 Section 355(a) of the FDCA requires a pharmaceutical 
company to first obtain FDA approval in order to market, or to 
import to market, a new drug.60  However, section 336 of the FDCA 
permits the FDA to exercise enforcement discretion with respect to 
“minor violations” of the FDCA if the “public interest will be 
adequately served.”61  As discussed in Part 1.1 above, the FDA has 
historically exercised enforcement discretion to permit the 
importation of finished drug products into the United States ahead of 
anticipated FDA approval, classifying these preapproval importations 
 
56.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, 
the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action.  The reviewing court shall—(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, 
and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law . . . In making the foregoing determinations, the 
court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account 
shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”). 
57.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
58.  Id. at 842-43. 
59.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (“[A]dministrative 
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it 
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying 
the force of law . . . Delegation of such authority may be shown . . . by an agency’s power 
to engage in . . . notice-and-comment rulemaking.”). 
60.  21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into 
interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to 
subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect to such drug.”). 
61.  21 U.S.C. § 336 (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as requiring the 
Secretary to report for prosecution, or for the institution of libel or injunction proceedings, 
minor violations of this chapter whenever he believes that the public interest will be 
adequately served by a suitable written notice or warning.”). 
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as “minor violations.”62  However, Congress failed to define what 
constitutes “minor violations” or the “public interest,” and therefore, 
it is not at all clear how far the Agency’s enforcement discretion 
extends under Section 336 of the FDCA.  
 As required by the Administrative Procedure Act, the FDA 
has engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking with respect to its 
regulations that permit the importation of unfinished bulk products 
into the United States ahead of FDA approval.63  Under the second 
step described in Chevron, if a reviewing court determines that 
Congress delegated authority to the FDA generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law, and “if the statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”64  As such, because the statute is ambiguous with respect to 
the scope of “minor violations,” the FDA’s regulations interpreting 
the FDCA to allow for preapproval importation of unfinished bulk 
product are valid and should be given deference by a reviewing court. 
 However, with respect to the importation of finished bulk 
product, the Agency has issued no regulations. And the FDCA is not 
silent with respect to the issue of the importation of new drugs—
section 355(a) is quite explicit that marketing approval is needed 
before a sponsor may import new drugs into the country.65 
 Section 355 of the FDCA was intended to ensure the safety and 
efficacy of new drugs.66  For example, section 355(b)(1) of the FDCA 
provides that an NDA or ANDA applicant is required to submit 
information, including “full reports of investigations which have been 
made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether 
such drug is effective in use . . . .”67  While the PLAIR program 
permits the importation of finished drug products into the United 
 
62.  Karst, supra note 3. 
63.  1 C.F.R. § 314.410(a)(2) ; 21 C.F.R. § 201.122(c). 
64.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
65.  21 U.S.C. § 355(a). 
66.  Richard S. Fortunato, FDA Disclosure of Safety and Efficacy Data: The Scope of 
Section 301(j), 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1280 n.2-3 (1984) (“A new drug” is defined as a drug 
whose composition is not generally recognized “as safe and effective for use under the 
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling,” or a drug whose 
composition has been so recognized as a result of investigations, but which has not “been 
used to a material extent or for a material time.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1982). . . . The Act 
provides that no person shall introduce into interstate commerce any new drug without 
premarket approval from the Secretary of Health and Human Services certifying that the 
drug is safe and effective for use. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (b) (1982)”). 
67.  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). 
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States ahead of anticipated FDA approval, a pharmaceutical 
company is still prohibited from marketing its new drug ahead of 
actual FDA approval.68  If the FDA does not grant approval, then a 
pharmaceutical company risks having to destroy or export its 
inventory.69  The PLAIR program still prohibits pharmaceutical 
companies from marketing new drugs without actual FDA approval, 
so that even if a drug has been imported, the public is still protected 
from consuming potentially unsafe or ineffective drugs.  
Consequently, because the intent of the FDCA is to protect the 
public health by ensuring citizens are not exposed to adulterated or 
misbranded drugs,70 and because the PLAIR program still prevents 
such exposure, it is not, at the very least, arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion under a Chevron analysis. 
 However, as previously noted, section 271(e)(4) of the Patent 
Act allows an NDA holder that has prevailed in a patent litigation to 
obtain a permanent injunction against a generic challenger to prevent 
it from importing its infringing drug product.71  These injunctions 
seem absolute—there is no exception allowing the FDA or anyone 
else to disregard a permanent injunction for public interest reasons or 
otherwise.  The Patent Act does not include a provision 
corresponding to section 336 of the FDCA granting enforcement 
discretion.  Even if there were such a provision, it would likely apply 
to the agency having general authority over the Patent Act, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office, not the FDA, which has 
no authority to interpret the Patent Act, and thus has no authority to 
issue regulations regarding permanent injunctions obtained under 
section 271(e)(4).  Because the intent of Congress with respect to 
section 271(e)(4) seems clear, and because the FDA has no authority 
to say otherwise, courts performing a Chevron analysis should hold as 
unlawful and set aside any FDA action under the PLAIR program 
that would allow importation of an infringing drug product in 
violation of a permanent injunction.  But if there are no permanent 
injunctions prohibiting importation, then per the second step of the 
Chevron analysis courts should defer to the FDA’s decision to allow 
preapproval importation as a “minor violation” of section 355(a) of 
the FDCA. 
 
68.  FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 2. 
69.  Id. at 6 (“the finished dosage form drug product should be exported or destroyed 
within 90 days of the refusal”); Laot, supra note 5. 
70.  21 U.S.C. § 393(b). 
71.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(II); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4). 
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3.2.  Prosecutorial Discretion 
 Although PLAIR allows for the type of behavior that both 
section 355(a) of the FDCA and section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act 
prohibit, it is important to distinguish between lawful and unlawful 
activity.  PLAIR does not declare the importation of finished drug 
products into the United States ahead of anticipated FDA approval 
to be lawful.  When the FDA grants a PLAIR request, the Agency is 
simply exercising its enforcement discretion to not prosecute a 
violation of section 355(a) of the FDCA.  But it is also important to 
highlight that the FDA’s determination to not prosecute an unlawful 
activity is well within its discretion.72 
 In the landmark case on prosecutorial discretion, Heckler v. 
Chaney, the Supreme Court affirmed the FDA’s right to determine 
for itself how to enforce the FDCA.73  For practical reasons, the FDA 
cannot act against each technical violation of the FDCA.74  An agency 
decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a 
number of factors that are peculiarly within its expertise, including: 
(1) whether a violation has occurred, (2) whether the agency has 
sufficient resources to take action, (3) whether prosecuting the 
violation is an efficient use of agency resources, (4) whether the 
agency is likely to succeed if it acts, and (5) whether taking action 
aligns with the Agency’s overall policies.75  The Heckler court 
reasoned that the FDA is far better equipped than the courts to deal 
with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its 
priorities.76 
 The Supreme Court subsequently reiterated in Buckman Co. v. 
Plaintiffs Legal Committee that the FDA has “complete discretion” to 
decide how and when to enforce the FDCA, and must exercise its 
prosecutorial discretion to balance statutory objectives.77  The 
Buckman decision suggests that the FDA essentially has unlimited 
 
72.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal 
Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 348-49 (2001). 
73.  Heckler, 470 U.S. at 837-38 (“The general exception to reviewability provided by 
[the Administrative Procure Act] § 701(a)(2) for action “committed to agency discretion” 
remains a narrow one . . . but within that exception are included agency refusals to 
institute investigative or enforcement proceedings, unless Congress has indicated 
otherwise. In so holding, we essentially leave to Congress, and not to the courts, the 
decision as to whether an agency's refusal to institute proceedings should be judicially 
reviewable.”). 
74.  Id. at 831. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. at 831-32. 
77.  Buckman, 531 U.S. at 348. 
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discretion to prosecute or excuse violations of the FDCA as it sees 
fit.78  Notwithstanding Heckler and Buckman, a recent decision from 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia shows that the 
FDA’s enforcement discretion is not be entirely shielded from 
judicial review.79  In Cook v. Food and Drug Administration, the D.C. 
Circuit held that where there are clear statutory guidelines for the 
FDA to follow in exercising its enforcement discretion, the FDA’s 
compliance with such guidelines is subject to judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.80  Consequently, Cook suggests that, 
because section 355(a) clearly prohibits importation of finished drug 
products “unless an approval of an application . . . is effective with 
respect to such drug,” the FDA’s decision not to prosecute violations 
of section 355(a)—as it does under PLAIR—may be subject to 
judicial review.81  However, even if allowing preapproval importation 
under PLAIR is subject to judicial review, the Agency’s allowance of 
such importations is not necessarily an abuse of discretion. 
 In light of Heckler and Buckman, the PLAIR program’s 
allowance for “minor violations” of section 355(a) to permit the 
importation of finished drug products ahead of anticipated FDA 
approval is consistent with the scope of the Agency’s enforcement 
discretion.  Furthermore, even if the PLAIR program is subject to 
judicial review under Cook, allowing for preapproval importations is 
likely not an abuse of the FDA’s prosecutorial discretion.  Note, 
however, that this allowance is limited to the extent that the 
importation of finished drug products is not subject to restrictions by 
other regulatory schemes, including injunctions under the Patent Act, 
outside the control of the FDA. 
3.3.  Authority to Regulate  
 In a modern case on the scope of the FDA’s regulatory power, 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme Court held 
that where Congress enacts a regulatory scheme outside the control 
of the FDA, the Agency may not regulate that area.82  The power of 
the FDA to regulate must always be grounded in a valid grant of 
 
78.  James M. Beck et al., Don’t Forget FDA Prosecutorial Discretion, DRUG AND 
DEVICE LAW (Oct. 5, 2012), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2012/10/dont-forget-
fda-prosecutorial-discretion.html. 
79.  See Cook v. Food & Drug Admin., 733 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
80.  Id. 
81.  21 U.S.C. § 355(a); see Cook, 733 F.3d at 10. 
82.  Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 161. 
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authority from Congress.83  In other words, the FDA may only 
regulate in areas specified by its authorizing statute. 
 The FDCA grants the Agency the authority to regulate, among 
other things, drugs and devices.84  In particular, pursuant to section 
355(a), the FDA possesses the authority to regulate the importation 
of drugs into the United States.85  However, such authority to regulate 
must be squared with the fact that the importation of drugs into the 
United States might also be subject to regulation by other regulatory 
schemes outside the control of the FDA, such as the Patent Act.  
 Under the Patent Act, the power to regulate patents is granted 
to the Secretary of Commerce.86  The FDA is not granted any general 
authority with respect to the Patent Act.  However, the Patent Act 
does grant the FDA authority to do one thing—the FDA has the 
power to determine the period of extension of patent terms for drugs, 
devices, and additives that are subject to regulation by the FDCA.87 
 There is no evidence that Congress intended to authorize the 
FDA to regulate patent-related issues beyond the specifically recited 
power to determine the period of extension of patent term for the 
limited class of items.  Therefore, if a generic drug is subject to a 
permanent injunction pursuant to section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act, 
it is not eligible for pre-launch importation. The FDA cannot ignore 
the statutory mandate of the Patent Act. 
 The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that, subject 
to the limitations discussed above, PLAIR is a valid regulatory 
program.  The FDA has the authority to regulate the importation of 
drugs into the United States and the right to exercise enforcement 
discretion to not prosecute a violation of section 355(a) of the FDCA.  
However, that authority is limited to the extent that the importation 
of finished drug products is not subject to restrictions by other 
regulatory schemes, including the Patent Act, that are outside the 
control of the FDA. 
 
83.  Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 161. 
84.  21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 321(g)-(h), 393. 
85.  21 U.S.C. § 355(a). 
86.  35 U.S.C. § 2(a). 
87.  35 U.S.C. §§ 156(c)(d)(1)(C), 156(c)(4)(d)(2)(A)(ii)-(B)(ii) (“The term of a 
patent eligible for extension . . . shall be extended by the time equal to the regulatory 
review period for the approved product which period occurs after the date the patent is 
issued”). 
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4.  The Conflict Between the PLAIR Program and the  
Hatch-Waxman Act 
4.1.  The Conflict 
 When the FDA grants a PLAIR request, it does not declare 
the importation to be lawful—instead, the Agency simply exercises its 
enforcement discretion to not prosecute a violation of section 355(a) 
of the FDCA.  However, importation under PLAIR may nevertheless 
violate a permanent injunction granted pursuant to section 271(e)(4) 
of the Patent Act, which was added as part of the Hatch-Waxman 
amendments.88  Regardless of whether the FDA chooses not to 
prosecute a violation of section 355(a), it has no power to abrogate 
the Patent Act amendments added by Hatch-Waxman.89 
 If a generic company files an ANDA with a Paragraph IV 
certification, the brand-name company can respond by bringing an 
infringement action within forty-five days.90  If the brand-name 
company does not file suit within that time, then the FDA can 
approve the ANDA immediately.91  Here, there is no conflict between 
PLAIR and Hatch-Waxman since the brand-name company never 
asserted its patent rights, and thus the generic company can take 
advantage of an approved PLAIR request to import its generic drug 
ahead of anticipated ANDA approval. 
 However, if the brand-name company files suit within that 
time, then the FDA is barred from approving the ANDA until the 
expiration of a thirty-month stay.92  The only exceptions to the thirty-
 
88.  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012), 35 U.S.C. §§ 
156, 271(e) (2012)). 
89.  Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 120.  Although it is beyond the 
scope of this Article, there is an alternative argument that the FDA has authority to 
abrogate injunctions issued under section 271(e)(4) by virtue of its authority to regulate all 
aspects of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Hatch-Waxman was created as a tool to allow the 
FDA to regulate generic drug marketing.  Even though the permanent injunction 
provision of section 271(e)(4) was inserted into the Patent Act, by virtue of originating 
from Hatch-Waxman, the FDA may be able to abrogate permanent injunctions granted by 
271(e)(4) by virtue of its arguable authority to regulate all aspects of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act (regardless of whether the amendments ended up in Title 21 or 35).  Thus, generic 
manufacturers could use a PLAIR request to overcome an injunction under 271(e)(4) to 
import prior to final ANDA approval.  However, if an injunction is issued under 271(a) 
(i.e., during a typical patent infringement action), then a PLAIR request could not be used 
to allow importation during the term of the injunction. 
90.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
91.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
92.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(dd). 
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month stay are if the patent expires, or if the district court finds that 
the patent is either invalid or not infringed, at which point the FDA 
can approve the ANDA immediately.93  If one of these exceptions 
occurs, there is again no conflict between PLAIR and Hatch-Waxman 
since the brand-name company has no valid patent rights to assert 
against the ANDA filer.  In this case, the generic company can take 
advantage of an approved PLAIR request to import its generic drug 
ahead of anticipated ANDA approval. 
 The conflict between PLAIR and Hatch-Waxman arises only 
when a district court finds that the patent is both valid and infringed.94  
In this case, the FDA cannot approve the ANDA until the patent 
expires.95  Furthermore, the brand-name company is entitled to seek a 
permanent injunction against the generic pursuant to section 
271(e)(4) of the Patent Act, which can be used to stop the generic 
company from importing its infringing drug product before the date 
that the patent expires.96  Therefore, under Hatch-Waxman, the 
generic company should not be able to take advantage of PLAIR to 
import its generic drug into the United States ahead of anticipated 
ANDA approval.97 
 The problem with the PLAIR program is that it does not 
consider the Hatch-Waxman Act, notwithstanding the fact that 
Hatch-Waxman essentially serves as the statutory basis for regulating 
the entire generic pharmaceutical industry.98  Under the PLAIR 
program, a generic company could theoretically import its generic 
drug ahead of anticipated ANDA approval, regardless of whether 
there is a permanent injunction barring such importation.99  This is 
precisely what occurred in Sanofi v. Apotex, discussed below, where 
 
93.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)–(IV). 
94.  Note that the conflict also likely only arises when the generic challenger is the 
first Paragraph IV ANDA filer.  Later filers typically cannot launch their products until 
after the first filer’s 180-day exclusivity period has expired.  Depending on when the first 
filer begins marketing its generic drug, later filers have at a minimum 180 days after the 
patent expires to import their generic drugs.  Since the patent has expired, later filers who 
take advantage of PLAIR to import during the 180-day exclusivity period to be ready to 
launch when the 180-day exclusivity period expires will not conflict with section 271(e)(4) 
of the Patent Act. 
95.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(II). 
96.  Id. 
97.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B). 
98.  See FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2. 
99.  Id. 
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the FDA did not consider a prior permanent injunction and approved 
the PLAIR request.100  
4.2.  Sanofi v. Apotex 
 Sanofi v. Apotex is the first Hatch-Waxman case in which the 
conflict with the PLAIR program has been raised as an issue.  Sanofi-
Synthelabo (Sanofi) is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 4,847,265 (the 
’265 patent), which expired on November 17, 2011, with a period of 
pediatric exclusivity that expired on May 17, 2012.101  The ’265 patent 
covers Plavix (clopidogrel bisulfate), a blockbuster drug used to treat 
heart attacks and strokes.102 
 On November 16, 2001, Apotex filed an ANDA for Plavix that 
included a Paragraph IV certification against ’265 patent.103  Since 
Apotex was the first applicant to file a Paragraph IV ANDA, it was 
entitled to 180 days of marketing exclusivity against later-filing 
applicants.104 
 In response to the ANDA filing, Sanofi brought an 
infringement action against Apotex in the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York in March 2002.105  More than five years 
later, the Court held that the ’265 patent was both valid and infringed, 
and that Sanofi was entitled to a permanent injunction against 
Apotex per section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act.106  In December 2008, 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.107 
 In January 2006, while the infringement action was still 
pending in the District Court, the FDA approved the ANDA.108  
Before the District Court could render its decision on the validity of 
the ’265 patent, Apotex initiated an at-risk launch on August 8, 2006, 
(which also triggered the start of its 180-day exclusivity period).109  
 
100.  See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2-3, Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 
1:02-cv-02255-SHS (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2012). 
101.  Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
102.  Id. 
103.  Id. at 357. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. at 397. 
107.  Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F. 3d 1075, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
108.  Apotex clopidogrel at-risk launch costs US$442 million, GABI ONLINE – GENERIC 
AND BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.gabionline.net/Generics/ 
News/Apotex-clopidogrel-at-risk-launch-costs-US-442-million; Sanofi-Synthelabo, 492 F. 
Supp. 2d at 357. 
109. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 317, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) aff’d 
sub nom. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  On August 8, 
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However, just three weeks later, the District Court issued a 
preliminary injunction ordering Apotex to stop its sales of generic 
Plavix (and subsequently issued a permanent injunction, as 
mentioned above).110 
 Then in April 2012, notwithstanding the permanent injunction, 
Apotex filed a PLAIR request with the FDA to import its generic 
product ahead of anticipated ANDA approval on May 17, 2012, 
which was the date of the expiration of the ‘265 patent.111  On May 7, 
2012, the FDA approved the PLAIR request.112  
 Just a few days before the PLAIR request was approved by the 
FDA, Apotex filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 60(b)(6) to 
amend the 2007 permanent injunction to include the underlined text: 
[Apotex is] hereby permanently enjoined from engaging in the 
commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell or sale within the 
United States, or importation into the United States of drug 
products as claimed in [the ‘265 patent], until the expiration of 
[the ‘265 patent] and any period of pediatric exclusivity that 
may be granted, except for importation by Apotex to its own 
warehouse facilities prior to the expiration of the pediatric 
exclusivity period to the extent such importation is permitted by 
[the FDA] pursuant to a [PLAIR request] made by Apotex and 
granted by the FDA.113 
Apotex argued that because it initiated an at-risk launch and 
forfeited its 180-day marketing exclusivity, it must be permitted to 
take advantage of PLAIR so as not to be placed at a competitive 
disadvantage.114  Other manufacturers of generic Plavix would be able 
to use the PLAIR program to import their products ahead of 
 
2006, Apotex initiated an at-risk launch of its generic product, in advance of a 
determination on the merits of its invalidity defense against the ‘265.  Id.  Sanofi moved 
for a preliminary injunction prohibiting Apotex from distributing its generic product.  Id.  
On August 31, 2006, the District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a 
preliminary injunction, but denied a recall on the approximately six-month supply of 
generic product that had already been shipped to distributors in the United States.  Id. 
110.  GABI ONLINE – GENERIC AND BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE, supra note 108.  Note 
that by launching at-risk, Apotex triggered the start of its 180-day exclusivity period, but 
then lost the benefit of the exclusivity period when it was enjoined shortly thereafter.  
Sanofi-Synthelabo, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 344-45.  However, this was a small loss, since when 
Apotex lost in litigation it was forced to amend its Paragraph IV certification to a 
Paragraph III certification, which would have caused an immediate forfeiture under 35 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(III). 
111.  Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 2012-1383 (Fed. Cir. May 15, 2012) (order 
denying motion). 
112.  Id. 
113.  Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2-3, Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:02-
cv-02255-SHS (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2012) (emphasis in original). 
114.  Id. 
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anticipated ANDA approval, and therefore Apotex’s competitors 
would be ready to launch the minute after Sanofi’s exclusivity expired 
on May 17, 2012.115  In contrast, the permanent injunction would bar 
Apotex from even importing its generic product until May 17, 2012.116  
Because the first-mover advantage is critical in generic drug sales, 
even the slight marketing delay caused by the permanent injunction 
would unfairly present Apotex with “extreme and undue hardship.” 
 On May 10, 2012, the District Court denied Apotex’s motion to 
amend the 2007 permanent injunction, holding that the five-year 
delay in bringing the motion was not reasonable.117  Unfortunately, 
the District Court did not address whether the proposed amendment 
to allow importation under PLAIR would have been granted if it had 
been brought in a timely manner.  A few days later, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, also without addressing the 
substance of the proposed amendment.118  Then on May 18, 2012, the 
day Sanofi’s exclusivity expired, the FDA approved the ANDAs of 
Apotex and six other generic companies.119  Apotex’s competitors 
were able to immediately launch their generic products.120  Although 
Apotex also launched its own generic version of Plavix, as evidenced 
by the fact that it is currently marketing the product in the United 
States, the company has not publicized the specific date on which it 
launched its version following the FDA’s en masse approval.121 
 The Sanofi case shows how conflict between the Hatch-
Waxman Act and the PLAIR program stems from the fact that the 
FDA and the courts are enforcing two different sets of rules.  The 
policies of the PLAIR program only require the FDA to review a 
limited set of information, which does not include possible injunctions 
 
115.  Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2-3, Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:02-
cv-02255-SHS (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2012). 
116.  Id. at 5-6. 
117.  Sanofi-Synthelabo, No. 2012-1383 (order denying motion). 
118.  Id. 
119.  Drug In Focus April 2012: Clopidogrel, GENERICSWEB (Apr. 2012), 
http://www.genericsweb.com/download/DIF%20Clopidogrel.pdf.  The six other generic 
companies were Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., Mutual Pharmaceuticals Co., Mylan Inc., 
Roxane Laboratories, Inc., Sun Pharma USA, and Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
120.  Dr Reddy's Laboratories, Mylan Launch Clopidogrel Tablets in US Market, 
ECONOMIC TIMES (May 18, 2012), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-05-
18/news/31765607_1_paragraph-iv-tablets-generic-version. 
121.  Clopidogrel Tablets USP, 75MG, 30 TABLET (BOTTLE) - Apotex Products: 
United States, APOTEX CORP., http://www.apotex.com/us/en/products/detail.asp?m=45969 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
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against the requester.122  In Sanofi v. Apotex, Apotex did not submit 
information on the permanent injunction against it, and the FDA 
presumably was not aware of it when approving the PLAIR request.123  
The courts, in contrast, refused to allow Apotex to insert PLAIR-
related language into the permanent injunction.  As shown in Sanofi, 
the courts reviewed the entire record before it, which included the 
2007 permanent injunction.124 
 Because the courts did not address the substance of Apotex’s 
motion, we do not know whether a court would allow a permanent 
injunction issued under section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act to be 
abrogated by a PLAIR request.  However, as discussed in Part 3, 
supra, while the FDA has the authority to regulate the importation of 
drugs into the United States and the right to allow preapproval 
importation via the PLAIR program, the Agency does not have any 
authority to regulate with respect to the Patent Act.  As such, the 
courts should not allow PLAIR-based importations during the 
pendency of a permanent injunction. 
5.  The PLAIR Program and the Intent of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act 
 The goal of the PLAIR program is to allow pharmaceutical 
companies to import unapproved finished drug products in 
preparation for market launch.125  Here we discuss how this goal does 
not conflict with the intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which is to 
strike a balance between conflicting policy objectives—enabling 
generic companies to bring low-cost drugs to the market while 
maintaining incentives for pioneers to develop and launch innovative 
new drugs.126  These objectives are reflected in the two parts of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act: Title I, the Drug Price Competition Act, which 
amended section 355 of the FDCA, and Title II, the Patent Term 
Restoration Act, which amended section 271 of the Patent Act.127   
The intent of each part is separate and distinct, and therefore, the 
 
122.  FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1. 
123.  See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2-3, Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 
1:02-cv-02255-SHS (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2012).  Interestingly, even if the FDA were aware of 
the permanent injunction, it is not clear that this would have had any effect on its decision 
to approve Apotex’s PLAIR request. 
124.  Sanofi-Synthelabo, No. 2012-1383 (order denying motion). 
125.  FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
126.  aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 230; Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. I, at 14-15 (1984). 
127.  H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 20; pt. 1, at 37. 
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PLAIR program and its effects will be discussed in the context of 
Title I and Title II in Parts 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.128 
5.1.  Title I and Making Generic Drugs Available to the Public 
 The intent of the Drug Price Competition Act is to make more 
generic drugs available to the public.129  It is in the public interest that 
generic drug manufacturers bring their products to market as soon as 
possible because the price of generic drugs is significantly discounted 
from the price of brand-name drugs.130  In addition, it is in the public 
interest that there be as many generic competitors in the marketplace 
as possible, since the more generic competitors there are in the 
marketplace, the cheaper the generic drugs become.131  The PLAIR 
program aligns with the intent of Title I by helping generic 
manufacturers expedite the commercial launch of their products.132  
As such, from this policy standpoint, Apotex arguably should have 
been permitted to take advantage of its approved PLAIR request. 
 As discussed in Part 1.2, supra, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
primarily helps bring generics to market via the ANDA process, 
which most notably allows generic competitors to use Paragraph IV 
certifications to seek market entry prior to the expiration of the 
patents covering the brand-name drug.133  Additionally, in order to 
encourage Paragraph IV challenges, Hatch-Waxman provides that 
the first applicant to file an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification 
will be granted 180 days of market exclusivity upon market launch, in 
 
128.  H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14; pt. 2, at 11. 
129.  H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (“The purpose of Title I of the Bill is to make 
available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug procedure for pioneer 
drugs first approved after 1962.”).   
130.  FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GENERIC DRUGS: QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/questionsanswers/ucm 
100100.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (According to the FDA, “[a]lthough generic drugs 
are chemically identical to their branded counterparts, they are typically sold at substantial 
discounts from the branded price.”). 
131.  Avery, supra note 38, at 179 n.56 (“For example, when generic Prozac 
(Fluoxetine) entered the market, the first generic challenger sold it at $1.91/capsule, or 
12% below the cost of brand-name Prozac.  Two months after the exclusivity period 
expired, multiple generics had entered the market and the price of generic Prozac had 
dropped to $0.32/capsule.”). 
132.  FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1; Kurt R. Karst, PLAIRs–
What are They and What are FDA’s Current Policies?, FDA LAW BLOG (Apr. 11, 2010), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2010/04/plairs-what-are-they-and-
what-are-fdas-current-policies.html. 
133.  H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
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exchange for assuming the costs and the risks associated with 
litigation.134 
 In Sanofi v. Apotex, Apotex was the first applicant to file an 
ANDA with Paragraph IV certification, and therefore secured the 
180-day exclusivity period.135  However, Apotex lost in litigation, lost 
the exclusivity period, and was enjoined from importing generic 
Plavix until the expiration of Sanofi’s patent.136  In contrast, Apotex’s 
competitors were able to import and stockpile their products prior to 
patent expiry via the PLAIR program.137  Consequently, these other 
generic manufacturers were ready and able to ship generic Plavix to 
their customers the minute Sanofi’s patent expired.138  Apotex argued 
that it would not be able to compete in the marketplace against its 
competitors because by being delayed in market launch by even a 
single day, it risked losing profits forever because it would not be able 
to match the delivery schedules of its competitors.139 
 While this result for Apotex was legally correct, it was also 
contrary to the intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act to encourage generic 
manufactures to bring more of their products to the market.  By 
challenging Sanofi’s patents, Apotex assumed the costs and risks 
associated with litigation.  However, just because Apotex lost in 
litigation does not mean that it should be placed at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to later filing applicants who did not face the 
costs and the risks associated with litigation.  But this is precisely 
what occurred in Sanofi v. Apotex.140  After Sanofi successfully sued 
Apotex for patent infringement, Apotex converted its Paragraph IV 
certification to a Paragraph III certification, in which it certified it 
would not launch its generic product until after Sanofi’s patent 
expired.141  Apotex was able to manufacture its generic product in a 
 
134.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Representative Henry Waxman, Speech at the 
Generic Pharmaceutical Association’s First Annual Policy Conference: Securing the Future 
of Affordable Medicine (Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/waxman/ 
news_files/news_statements_generic_pharmaceutical%20_association_9.20.05.htm.  
135.  Sanofi-Synthelabo, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 357. 
136.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4); Sanofi-Synthelabo, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 397; Sanofi-
Synthelabo, 550 F.3d at 1090. 
137.  Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3, 5 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:02-
cv-02255-SHS (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2012). 
138.  Id. 
139.  Id. at 5-6. 
140.  Id. at 3, 5. 
141.  Letter from Keith Webber, Deputy Director, Office of Pharmaceutical Science, 
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, to Kiran Krishnan, Director, North American 
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foreign country prior to the expiry of Sanofi’s patent, but it was not 
able to import this product into the United Sates.142  Apotex’s 
competitors were not similarly restrained.  Consequently, even 
though there was effectively no difference between Apotex and its 
competitors—no one was going to launch a generic prior to the 
expiration of Sanofi’s exclusivity period—Apotex was placed at a 
competitive disadvantage merely for taking the risk of filing the first 
Paragraph IV challenge.  This should not be the result.  Instead, 
keeping with the intent of Hatch-Waxman, Apotex should have been 
permitted to take advantage of its approved PLAIR request to 
expedite its product launch. 
5.2.  Title II and Incentivizing Research and Development by  
Brand-Name Manufacturers 
 The intent of the second part of Hatch-Waxman, the Patent 
Term Restoration Act, is to induce brand-name companies to make 
the investments necessary to research and to develop new drugs by 
restoring some of the patent term lost during the FDA approval 
process.143  Title II permits the extension of the term of a patent for a 
definite period of time provided that certain requirements are met, 
where this period of time is primarily based on marketing delays 
created while the product is awaiting FDA approval.144  Congress was 
explicit that the extension of the patent term should be a definite 
period of time with no other direct or indirect method of extending 
patent term, and thereafter, immediate competition should be 
encouraged.145  For that reason, Title I, the Drug Price Competition 
Act, permits the filing and tentative approval of ANDAs before 
 
Regulatory Affairs, Apotex Corp. (May 12, 2012) (on file with the Food and Drug 
Administration). 
142.  35 U.S.C. 271(e)(4)(b) (emphasis added) (“For an act of infringement . . . 
injunctive relief may be granted against an infringer to prevent the commercial 
manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale within the United States or importation into the 
United States of an approved drug, veterinary biological product, or biological 
product. . . .”). 
143.  H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 11 (“Title II of the Bill encourages drug 
manufacturers to assume the increased costs of research and development of certain 
products which are subject to premarketing clearance by restoring some of the time lost on 
patent life while the product is awaiting FDA approval.”). 
144.  H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 46. 
145.  Id. (“Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to 
grant exclusive rights to an inventor for a limited time.  That limited time should be a 
definite time, and thereafter, immediate competition should be encouraged.  For that 
reason, Title I of the Bill permits the filing of Abbreviated New Drug Applications before 
a patent expires and contemplates that the effective approval date will be the expiration 
date of the valid patent covering the original product.”). 
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patent expiration, and contemplates that the effective approval date 
will be the expiration date of the valid patent.146  In practice, there 
should be no lag between patent expiration and competition, and the 
generic drug should be able to enter the market the minute after the 
brand-name manufacturer’s patent expires.  But if the first applicant 
to file an ANDA with Paragraph IV certification loses in litigation, 
pursuant to section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act, it can be enjoined 
from importing its generic product into the United States before 
patent expiration, causing such a lag.147  This is precisely what 
happened in Sanofi v. Apotex.  Sanofi’s marketing exclusivity expired 
on May 16, 2012 and Apotex’s competitors were able to start shipping 
their generic products to customers at 12:01 a.m. on May 17.148 
 However, this result is contrary to the intent of the Hatch-
Waxman Act.  By delaying importation of generic drugs until after 
patent expiration, section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act effectively 
grants a de facto patent term extension, which is in direct conflict with 
Congress’ explicit intent to allow generic competition immediately 
after patent expiration.  PLAIR allows generic companies to 
warehouse their drugs in the United States prior to FDA approval so 
that they can expedite their market launches once they receive final 
approval from the Agency.  The PLAIR program aligns with the 
intent of Title II by ensuring that there is immediate competition 
after patent expiration.  Thus, from a policy standpoint, Apotex 
arguably should have been permitted to take advantage of its 
approved PLAIR request. 
6.  Solutions to the Conflict Between the PLAIR Program and 
Hatch-Waxman and Guidance for Practitioners 
 Although PLAIR does not conflict with the goals of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, and regardless of whether the FDA chooses to exercise 
enforcement discretion to not prosecute a violation of the FDCA, the 
Agency has no power to abrogate the statutory mandates of Hatch-
Waxman.  Under the current laws, pharmaceutical patent holders 
should be able to use permanent injunctions to prevent any 
importation prior to patent expiration, including preapproval 
importations via PLAIR requests.  Ultimately, whether to allow 
 
146.  H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 46 (emphasis added).  Note that this aligns with 
the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, which empowers Congress to grant 
exclusive rights to inventors “for limited times.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, clause 8. 
147.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4). 
148.  Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3, 5 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:02-
cv-02255-SHS. 
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generic companies to take advantage of PLAIR despite the conflict 
with Hatch-Waxman comes down to a policy choice that is up to 
Congress to make—it must choose whether to protect the patent 
rights of innovators or to speed generic drug competition. 
6.1.  Protecting Patent Rights 
 As discussed in Part 3, the FDA’s enforcement discretion does 
not give the Agency the power to override injunctions under section 
271(e)(4) of the Patent Act that prohibit importation of a generic 
drug.  To ensure that the FDA does not approve PLAIR requests 
during the term of a patent injunction, the FDA should amend the 
PLAIR process so that an applicant is required to submit information 
identifying any injunctions that may prohibit importation of its 
product.  For example, the FDA could amend the PLAIR Draft 
Guidance149 to require the following be included with all PLAIR 
requests: 
(j) A letter signed by an authorized representative of the 
applicant certifying under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 that the applicant is 
not a party to a court order subject to an injunction prohibiting 
importation of the drug product. 
This requirement will save both the FDA and the courts 
resources.  Such a requirement would allow the FDA to reject 
PLAIR requests that seek to illegally import products during the term 
of an injunction (or to summarily deny such requests if they fail to 
submit this required information).  In turn, this would prevent courts 
from having to weigh in on whether importation under the PLAIR 
request is proper.  
 Requiring PLAIR applicants to notify the FDA of injunctions 
prohibiting importation of their product would avoid the issue raised 
in Sanofi v. Apotex, where the FDA has approved Apotex’s PLAIR 
request without considering the permanent injunction against Apotex 
that prohibited importation before the expiration of Sanofi’s patent.  
The conflict between PLAIR and Hatch-Waxman is a waste of 
resources for both the FDA and the courts, and revision of the 
PLAIR process is necessary.  
6.2.  Accomplishing the Intent of Hatch-Waxman 
 Given that PLAIR accomplishes the intent of Hatch-Waxman, 
one solution to resolving the conflict between them is to incorporate 
language into the Hatch-Waxman Act permitting PLAIR-based 
 
149.  FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2 at 2-4. 
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importation.  Congress could revise section 271(e)(4) of the Patent 
Act with an amendment of subsection (B), adding similar language to 
the underlined text below: 
For an act of infringement [caused by filing an ANDA with a 
Paragraph IV certification] 
(A) the court shall order the effective date of any approval of 
the drug . . .  to be a date which is not earlier than the date of 
the expiration of the patent which has been infringed, 
(B) injunctive relief may be granted against an infringer to 
prevent the commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale 
within the United States or importation into the United States 
of an approved drug, veterinary biological product, or biological 
product, except importation into the United States shall be 
allowable to the extent that such importation is permitted by the 
Food and Drug Administration pursuant to a Pre-launch 
Activities Importation Request.150 
Such an amendment to subsection (B) would allow generic 
companies to import their products during the term of an injunction, 
while still prohibiting them from actually marketing their products 
until the brand-name manufacturer’s patent expires, thereby 
protecting the pioneer’s patent rights.  Furthermore, section 271(e)(4) 
could be further amended to only allow importation if the PLAIR 
applicant submits a letter signed by an authorized representative 
certifying under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 that it will not sell, offer to sell, or 
distribute its product prior to receiving final marketing approval from 
the FDA.151  Requiring such a letter would ensure that PLAIR still 
prohibits pharmaceutical companies from marketing new drugs 
without actual FDA approval, so that even if a drug has been 
imported, the public is still protected from consuming potentially 
unsafe or ineffective drugs. 
7.  Strategic Considerations for Practitioners 
 Until Congress or the FDA acts, practitioners are left with 
flawed statutory and regulatory schemes.  If a district court issues a 
permanent injunction pursuant to section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act 
to prohibit the generic company from importing its infringing drug 
product before the date that the patent expires, then the generic 
should not be able to take advantage of PLAIR to import its generic 
drug into the United States ahead of anticipated ANDA approval.  
The following sections discuss strategic considerations and 
 
150.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (emphasis added). 
151.  This would codify one of the current requirements for submitting PLAIR 
requests.  See FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2 at 3-4. 
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precautions for lawyers representing both generic manufacturers 
filing PLAIR requests and brand-name manufacturers seeking to stop 
preapproval importation of generics. 
7.1.  Guidance for Generic Companies 
 In order for a generic company to take advantage of the 
PLAIR program, it may wish to avoid the possibility of being 
enjoined under section 271 (e)(4) by filing its ANDA with a 
Paragraph III certification rather than a Paragraph IV certification.  
Since filing a Paragraph III certification is not an act of patent 
infringement, the pioneer will not be able to sue the ANDA applicant 
to seek an injunction.152  Of course, the disadvantage of filing a 
Paragraph III certification is the generic applicant must wait until the 
pioneer’s patent expires to enter the market, but this may be a moot 
point in certain cases.  
 For example, the first generic company to file an ANDA will 
likely include a Paragraph IV certification in order to secure the 180-
day exclusivity period.153  However, if during litigation it appears that 
the pioneer may prevail in proving both validity and infringement of 
its patent, the first filer may want to amend its Paragraph IV 
certification to a Paragraph III certification before the court can rule 
and issue an injunction.  While this will cause the first filer to forfeit 
its 180-day exclusivity period,154 it will also prevent the first filer from 
being enjoined from importing infringing product during the patent 
term.155  In this case, the generic challenger will not be able to enter 
the market until the pioneer’s patent expires, but this is no different 
from if the generic lost in litigation and was enjoined.  But by 
switching over to a Paragraph III certification before a court can issue 
an injunction, the generic manufacturer will preserve its ability to use 
the PLAIR program to import finished drug product prior to patent 
expiry, allowing it to launch immediately thereafter.156 
 This strategy may also be useful for later ANDA filers.  The 
first ANDA filer will typically enter into a reverse-payment 
settlement with the pioneer, where it agrees to delay marketing its 
generic product (typically until several months before the patent 
 
152.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III). 
153.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
154.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(III); see also Avery, supra note 38, at 186. 
155.  21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii)(II). 
156.  Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2-3, 5, Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 
1:02-cv-02255-SHS. 
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expires).157  This means that any later filers will be prevented from 
entering the market until the first filer’s 180-day exclusivity period 
runs, which may be no sooner than the expiration of the pioneer’s 
patent.158  If the later ANDA filer includes a Paragraph IV 
certification, it will pointlessly risk an infringement suit and a possible 
injunction with little chance of entering the market before the first 
filer’s exclusivity period is over.  Since an injunction would prevent 
the later filer from utilizing the benefits of the PLAIR program, it 
may be advantageous for the later filer to simply file a Paragraph III 
certification from the start. 
7.2.  Guidance for Brand-Name Companies 
 In order for a brand-name company to prevent a generic 
manufacturer from using the PLAIR program to import finished drug 
product prior to the expiration of its patents, the pioneer must prevail 
in showing both validity and infringement of its patents, and then 
successfully secure an injunction barring the generic manufacturer 
from importing its product during the term of the patent.  
Furthermore, the pioneer should ensure that the injunction bars all 
importation into the United States, with no exceptions for PLAIR-
based importations. 
 If the pioneer becomes aware of a PLAIR request filed by a 
generic challenger that has been previously enjoined under section 
271(e)(4), the pioneer may consider filing a citizen petition with the 
FDA requesting that it deny the PLAIR request.159  In such a petition, 
the pioneer should inform the FDA of the injunction and argue that 
the FDA should deny the PLAIR request because the Agency does 
not have the authority to contravene the injunction by authorizing 
importation of the generic product prior to patent expiry.  
Alternatively, the pioneer may wish to be more aggressive and sue 
the FDA directly, seeking to enjoin the Agency from approving the 
PLAIR request.  While the authors are not aware of any such 
petitions or lawsuits, these strategies may allow a pharmaceutical 
patent holder to stop the FDA from approving a PLAIR request and 
prevent any importation prior to the expiration of its patents. 
 
157.  Matthew Avery & Mary Nguyen, The Roadblock to Generic Drugs: Declaratory 
Judgment Jurisdiction for Later Generic Challengers, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8-9 (2013). 
158.  Id. at 10-11. 
159.  See Matthew Avery et al., The Antitrust Implications of Filing “Sham” Citizen 
Petitions with the FDA, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 122-23 (2013). 
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Conclusion 
 A conflict arises between the PLAIR program and the Hatch-
Waxman Act when the FDA allows preapproval importation 
notwithstanding an injunction against a generic manufacturer 
prohibiting such importation.  While the FDA has the authority to 
regulate the importation of drugs into the United States and the right 
to allow preapproval importation via the PLAIR program, it does not 
have the authority to abrogate patent injunctions issued under section 
271(e)(4) of the Patent Act (which was added as part of the Hatch-
Waxman amendments).  
 Nevertheless, the PLAIR program does not conflict with the 
objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act of facilitating generic market 
entry while preserving incentives for pioneer’s to develop innovative 
new products.  Under the current laws, pharmaceutical patent holders 
should be able to use permanent injunctions to prevent any 
importation prior to patent expiration, including preapproval 
importations via PLAIR requests.  However, if Congress decides that 
speeding generic competition is more important than protecting the 
patent rights of pioneers, then it could resolve this conflict by 
amending section 271(e)(4) to include language permitting PLAIR-
based importations.  In the meantime, the FDA should amend the 
requirements of PLAIR requests so that applicants are required to 
notify the FDA of any injunctions prohibiting importation of their 
products.  Doing so would help the Agency to avoid violating the 
patent rights of pioneers and approving illegal importations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
